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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
LIABILITY OF AN INSURER PRIOR




Despite the fact an insurance company has failed to issue a
formal written policy of insurance at the time a loss occurs, situa-
tions nevertheless exist wherein it may be held liable to compensate
an applicant for a loss he has sustained. Broadly speaking, such
situations fall into three general classifications. They comprehend
cases wherein an insurer is held liable (1) because of oral agree-
ments made on its behalf by its agents; (2) because it has by its
conduct estopped itself or waived the right to deny the existence
of contractual liability; or (3) because it has failed to accept or
reject the application with reasonable promptness. Each is a settled
ground of recovery.
A policy of insurance is a contract and general rules of contract
law accordingly apply to it. An offer, usually in the form of a
written application for insurance, and an acceptance of that offer
are said to be necessary before the contract is formed.' Equally,
the consent of the offeree must be communicated to the offeror
before the contract is legally complete . And it is possible to find
cases holding that the last act creating the obligation of the contract
is the delivery of the policy to the insured person.' Hence the cases
referred to above, wherein liability is imposed before the home
office has had a chance to act, must be considered of an exceptional
character. They have been justified by the Court on the ground the
business of insurance companies is of a quasi-public character,
4
that the conventional liberty of contract found in other business
agreements is lacking because the applicant cannot in a practical
*Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Ulledalen v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 74 N.D. 589, 611-12, 23 N.W.2d
856, 867 (1946); Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 136, 293 N.W.
200, 209 (1940).
2. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-0301 (1943).
3. Storing v. Nat. Surety Co., 56 N.D. 14, 215 N.W. 875 (1927); cf. Mann v.
Policyholder's Nat. Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 730-31,"51 N.W.2d 853, 857-58 (1952)
(action for negligent delay is governed by North Dakota law although delay occurred
outside state). See generally, 2 Beale, Conflict of Liaws § 332.41 (1935).
4. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 138, 293 N.W. 200, 210
(1940); see Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. State, 71 N.D. 78, 86, 298 N.W.
773, 777 (1941); cf. Wanberg v. National Union F. Ins. Co., 46 N.D. 369, 179 N.W.
666 (1920), a''d, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).
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sense bargain over the terms of the policy,, on the theory of custom
and usage in the insurance business,' on the basis of a special
relationship of confidential character, involving trust and reliance
upon the representations of the insurer, assumed to exist between
applicant and insurer,7 and on, principles of agency.8 Thus it has
been said by the Court that "The purpose and nature of life in-
surance contracts, and the manner in which such contracts are
negotiated impress such contracts, and the relationship of the
parties, even during the negotiations, with characteristics unlike
those incident to contracts and negotiations for contracts in ordinary
commercial transactions."' This is a point of view clearly not con-
fined merely to contracts of life insurance.
II.
POWERS OF INSURANCE AGENTS
For the purposes of this discussion it is the holdings with ref-
crence to the scope of the insurance agent's authority to bind his
company which are of greatest immediate interest. The North
Dakota Code provides that any person who:
1. Solicits insurance on behalf of any insurance corporation ...
2. Transmits an application for a policy of insurance ... to...
any insurance corporation;
3. Makes any contract for insurance;
4. Collects any premium for insurance; or
5. Aids or assists in any manner in doing any of the things here-
inbefore mentioned . .. shall be regarded as the agent of such
corporation to all intents and purposes unless it can be shown
that he receives no compensation for such services .... 10
It is the clause of the statute which makes an insurance salesman
-an agent "to all intents and purposes" which invites examination.
In Anderson v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,1 plaintiff
insured property against loss by fire. A month after the policy
expired, defendant insurance company's agent orally agreed to
renew it. On the following day a fire occurred. Since its home office
5. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 141, 293 N.W. 200, 211
(1940).
6. Ulledalen v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 74 N.D. 589, 608, 23 N.W.2d 856, 865
(1946); Anderson v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 51 N.D. 917, 931-32, 201
N.W. 514, 519 (1924).
7. Bekken v. Equitable .Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 142, 293 N.W. 200, 212
(1940).
8. See discussion infra, pp. -
9. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 142, 293 N.W. 200, 212
(1940).
10. N.D. Rev. Code § 26-0702 (194,3) (emphasis supplied).
11. 51 N.D. 917, 201 N.W. 514 (1924).
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bad never approved the new policy the insurer denied liability. It
was held that despite the limitations on the agent's authority con-
tained in his contract of appointment the statute neverthless con-
ferred on him authority to bind the insurer by oral agreement. If
the applicant for insurance had knowledge of the limitations placed
by the company on its agent's authority, it was said, a different
result would have been reached. But in the absence of such notice,
a member of the general public consulting an insurance agent is
entitled to regard him as a general agent.12 "It will scarcely be
contended," said the Court, "that the company could, by stipulation
in the poli~y, or the application, divest Kavanaugh of the character
of an agent, to all intents and purposes, with which he was invested
by the statute if he performed certain acts."'
The results which this construction of the statute has enabled the
North Dakota Court to reach were summarized in Ulledalen v.
United States Fire Insurance Co.,'1 4 a 1946 decision closely re-
sembling the Anderson case. Plaintiff applied for fire insurance.
He testified he went to see defendant insurer's agent. He testified
further: "I asked him for a $1000 policy upon my household goods,
and he said, 'all right,' he said, and turned to Miss Snydal and asked
ler to make the application out, which she started to do, and I
asked him what time or how long it would be before he would
know what the premiums would be, as I had previously asked him
how long it would be, and he said he didn't know because he didn't
know what the rate was up in our neighborhood; I asked him how
long it would be before he would know and he said as soon as the
policy comes back, and I said 'how long will that be,' and he said,
you can figure the policy is in effect right now.' . . .
"Q. And did Mr. Grantier say anything to you as to when you
should pay the premium?"
"A. He said: 'As soon as I find out I will let you know.'"
A fire- broke out before the policy was issued and the insurer
disclaimed responsibility for the loss. Holding for plaintiff, the
Supreme Court used the following language:
12. Accord, McCabe Bros. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 N.D. 19, 27, 81 N.W. 426, 430-31
(1899) (insurance solicitor held general agent of company); Boos v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
22 N.D. 11, 132 N.W. 222 (1911). Of course, to call an insurance agent a "general
agent" does not settle the question whether a given act is within the scope of his
authority. "An agent for a particular act or transaction is called a special agent. All
others are general agents." N.D. Rev. Code § 3-0102 (1943). The point is made in
Restatement, Agency § 3, comment c (1933), that a general agent "may have little dis-
cretion in regard to the transactions which he is employed to perform, while a special
agent may have great discretion in the single transaction which he conducts."
13. Anderson v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 51 N.D. 917, 930, 201 N.W.
514, 518 (1924).
14. 74 N.D. 589, 23 N.W.2d 856 (1946).
[VOL. 36
1960] LIABILITY OF INSURER PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF POLICY 107
"It is settled law in this state that a person duly licensed as an
agent of a foreign fire insurance company, and who performs
acts enumerated in ND Rev Code 1943 § 26-0702, relating to
the business of such insurance company, and is thus to 'be
regarded as the agent of such corporation to all intents and
purposes unless it can be shown that he receives no compensa-
tion for such services,' has power to make a parol agreement
on behalf of the company to renew a policy about to expire....
He also has power to enter into a parol agreement to renew
the policy after it has expired .... ."
"It logically follows that such agent also has authority to make
a preliminary parol contract of insurance pending the issuance
of a written policy . . . . The making of such preliminary oral
contract is not something out of the ordinary, but is a common
practice."15
Despite the breadth' of the language used in the foregoing
opinions, it is possible to find cases wherein the Court has taken
a more restrictive view of the operation of the statute. In Kopa!d
Electric Co. v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.," an insurance
agent asked an automobile owner if he wanted liability insurance
on his car. On receiving an affirmative answer he told the applicant,
"You are covered right now." He also stated "The policy would be
issued at Fargo." No written application was ever made to the
company and the plaintiff's case rested on these oral statements
alone. Half an hour after this conversation the vehicle was wrecked
in an accident. The Court ruled for the insurer. It declared that
the statute, instead of constituting a substantive grant of authority
to the insurance salesman, "merely fixes the relationship of the
solicitor as to the company or the insurer. It does not define the
scope of his authority . . ."17
In Meyer v. National F. Ins. Co.,'" a similar reading of the statute
occurred. Plaintiff was a farmer who gave a note in payment of
fire insurance on his buildings. The policy provided that coverage
lapsed if payment of the note was not made on time. When plaintiff
failed to pay he was expressly advised in writing by the insurer
that his policy was suspended. Thereafter, the insurer's agent told
plaintiff, in response to an inquiry, "That's all right, you can pay
15. Id. at 607-08, 23 N.W.2d at 865.
16. 64 N.D. 213, 251 NW. 852 (1933).
17. Id. at 217, 251 N.W. at 854. This construction is approved and followed in McVay
v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Okla. 1939), construing
a similar Oklahoma statute.
18. 67 N.D. 77, 269 N.W. 845 (1936). which is also reported at a later stage of
litigation at 69 N.D. 456, 287 N.W. 813 (1939).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
it this fall." A fire thereafter caused substantial loss. It was held
that in view of the notice the company had given, the agent lacked
authority to extend the time of payment. The court stated the
section "specifies what constitutes an agent; but" does not purport
to define the extent of his powers . . . . The agent has only such
authority as the principal actually or ostensibly confers upon
him."'
As between these two divergent theories of the operation of the
statute, it seems probable that the cases taking what may be
termed the "broad" view of the agent's power must be considered
generally controlling. Both the Kopald and Meyer decisions in-
volved situations in which actual knowledge of limitations placed
on the power of insurance agents by the home office was brought
home to the claimant20 Hence it would seem they are not authority
in other types of situations where such notice is not to be imputed.
In a careful consideration of the problem in 1950, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals came to the conclusion the broader read-
ing of the statute found in the Anderson and Ulledalen opinions
represented the prevailing law of North Dakota."
In this view of the matter, a number of inquiries suggest them-
selves. The most fundamental concerns the breadth and extent of
the authority enjoyed by a man who is an agent "to all intents and
purposes." Logically related to this question is the further problem
of determining exactly which chapters of the Code regulate and
define the agent's status. It may be asked, for example, whether
the statutes dealing with the general topic of agency apply to the
narrow subject of the insurance agency, or whether the insurance
agent's authdrity is to be measured solely by the yardstick of the
"intents and purposes" clause found in the Insurance chapters. Put
19. 67 N.D. at 84, 269 N.W. at 849.
20. In addition to the decisions mentioned in the text, a number of other North Dakota
cases also assert, by dictum or otherwise, the proposition that limitations on the agent's
authority of which a claimant has notice are binding upon the claimant. See Ulledalen v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 74 N.D. 589, 23 N.W.2d 856 (1946), syll. 3; Anderson v.
Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 51 N.D. 917, 926, 201 N.W. 514, 517 (1924);
Michigan-Idaho Lumber Co. v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 35 N.D. 244, 160 N.W.
130 (1916); Johnson v. Dakota Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 1 N.D. 1-67, 45 N.W. 799
(1890). Johnson v. Dakota 'Fire & Marine Ins. Co.; supra, is particularly noteworthy in
this respect. An insurance company's agent inserted false statements in an application for
hail insurance, knowing of their falsity. The Court declared that the agent had power to
fill -out the application, and' the limitations on his authority not communicated to the
applicant could not bind the applicant. But it was also held that the applicant was con-
clusively 'presumed to know the contents of the policy and of the application. The
applicant's silence, knowing of such false statements, constituted participation in the fraud
of the agent and rendered the policy void from its inception. The applicant had a duty
to notify the company. However, the insurer was held to have waived the fraud on other
grounds. The scope of the Johnson case, however, is materially narrowed in Leisen'v.
S1. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 20 N.D. 316, 127 N.W. 837 (1910).
21. Fargo Nat. Bank v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1950).
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in more precise form, the inquiry becomes whether the agent's
authority is wholly statutory in character and thus derived ex-
clusively from N.D. Rev. Code § 26-0702 (1943), or is actual or
ostensible in character as those terms are defined in N.D. Rev.
Code § 3-0202 (1943).
Difficulties arise no matter which of these alternatives is
suggested as the sole test. In the Anderson case, supra, which is the
strongest decision in support of the broad view of the insurance
agent's powers, the Court came very close to determining the scope
of the agent's authority under the "intents and purposes" clause by
equating it with the full breadth of the corporate powers possessed
by the insurance corporation which employs him. "It can not be
doubted that the company itself had the power to contract with
the plaintiff ...at the same premium and on the same condition
as provided in the original policy, and to agree that that instrument
should stand as the measure of the rights of the parties. It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that Kavanaugh, as agent of
defendant 'to all intents and purposes,' likewise had the power to
enter into such a renewal contract and bind his principal, at least
in the absence of any knowledge in plaintiff upon the authority as
between the agent and the defendant, and that the jury might have
so found." 2
It is, of course, possible to criticize such a construction of the
statute on a number of policy grounds. If followed logically to its
ultimate conclusions, this view would virtually obliterate all at-
tempts by the insurer to preserve meaningful distinctions in rank
and authority among its various officers and employees. From the
standpoint of the claimant, assuming he can meet the procedural
burden of showing the existence of an oral agreement by competent
evidence,2" it appears to make every insurance salesman the equi-
valent of a home office and validates the old maxim that ignorance
is bliss. It equally runs roughshod over the proposition that the
terms of the contract of appointment can qualify or limit the agent's
22. Anderson v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 51 N.D. 917, 926, 201 N.W.
514, 517 (1924).
23. The burden of proving the extent of the agent's authority is said to rest on the
moving pairty. Meyer v. National Fire Ins. Co., 67 N.D. 77, 84, 269 N.W. 845, 849
(1936); Corey v. Hunter, 10 N.D. 5, 84 N.W. 570 (1900). It seems probable the proof
o2 the oral contract should identify the parties, specify the rate of premium, identify the
life or property or risk which Js insured, the nature of the insured's interest, and the
p eriod, during which the insurance is to continue. These are the requisites of a written.
contract under N.D.'Rev. Code § 26-0301 (1943), and would seem to indicate the
essential elements of an oral contract as well. The evidentiary problems involved in prov-
ing the agent's authority by his own statements are considered in Kopald Electric Co. v.
Ocean Ace.'d: Guarantee Corp., 64 N.D. 213, 251 N.W. 852 (1933). See also N.D. Rev.
Code § 3-0208 (2) (1943).
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authority, in the absence of notice to the persons with whom the
agent deals of limitations on the agent's power. But if the statute
intends this result, such arguments become irrelevant from the
standpoint of adjudication. The conclusion that members of the
public ought to be protected against technicalities of which they
have no knowledge when purchasing insurance is one a legislature
might reasonably reach, and there seems no constitutional objection
to it if the agent's authority is viewed as entirely statutory in its
origin.
The difficulty with accepting the idea the agent's authority
has an exclusively statutory base lies instead in the qualification
the Court has repeatedly and consistently made in the doctrine.
If the applicant for insurance knows the agent lacks power to per-
form an act on behalf of his company, he is bound by that notice.
Manifestly, this last proposition is inconsistent with a wholly statu-
tory theory of the insurance agency, since it would otherwise
amount to saying that the coverage of a statute enacted for protec-
tion of the public could be narrowed by private agreement.
2 4
However, if one takes the opposite track and argues that the
general statutes regulating the topic of agency are also applicable
to the special case of the insurance agent, a measure of difficulty
is likewise encountered. The Code declares that: "An agent has
such authority as the principal actually or ostensibly confers upon
him. Actual authority is such as a principal intentionally confers
upon the agent or intentionally or by want of ordinary care allows
the agent to believe himself to possess. Ostensible authority is such
as the principal intentionally or by want of ordinary care causes
or allows a third person to believe the agent to possess."
2
5
Within the meaning of that definition it should be apparent the
insurance agent's authority to bind his company by oral agreement
is rarely of an actual character. In virtually every case the agree-
ment between company and agent enunciates in detailed fashion
the things the agent is not authorized to do and the application and
policy contain similar provisions. The insurance company which
would voluntarily yield to its solicitors the sweeping powers con-
ferred on them by the case law wculd be a rare and noteworthy
institution. The idea that the insurance agent's authority is of an
actual or consensual character is thus by far the least attractive of
the various possibilities.
24. See N.D. Rev. Code § 1-0228 (1943).
25. N.D. Rev. Code § 3-0202 (1943). Note that the question of ostensible authority
should be carefully distinguished from the question of ostensible agency. The latter subject
is regulated by N.D. Rev. Code § 3-0103 (1943).
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Then is the authority of the agent wholly ostensible in its nature?
The fact the Court regards limitations on the agent's power as
binding when the claimant knows of them is certainly consistent
with this point of view, and at times the Court has used express
language indicating reliance upon the ostensible authority idea. In
Weber v. United Hardware & Implement Mutuals Co.,26 an in-
surance agent made representations to a policyholder which led
him to settle a claim against third parties for less than its value.
The insurer then attempted to repudiate liability to the policy-
holder for the balance of the claim on the ground the settlement
bad destroyed its right of subrogation. It was held the insurer was
bound by the agent's representations. "The defendant had given
him ostensible if not actual authority for those statements.",,
Yet even here serious problems arise. In most instances -the
authority of the insurance agent does not fit comfortably into this
particular statutory mold. Under the Code ostensible authority is
present only in two situations: where the principal has intentionally
or by want of ordinary care allowed a third party to believe in its
existence.28 Few insurers intentionally assert to applicants a sween-
ing authority vested in their agents; and it is difficult to see how
an insurer can be charged with negligence when it carefully pre-
scribes the duties of its agent by contract and in the normal case
inserts in applications the express warning that the agent lacks
power to alter or change the terms of the policy. That the existence
of such ostensible authority cannot be ascribed to the statements
of the agent himself is equally apparent; for the Code further pro-
vides that an agent lacks authority to make representations as to
the terms of his own authority, though it qualifies this by permitting
the agent to make representations as to matters of fact on which
his right to use his authority depends.29 Even here, however, the
26. 75 N. D. 581, 31 N.W.2d 456 (1948). Another case involving the question of
ostensible authority on the part of insurance agents is Fargo Nat. Bank v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1950). The state agent of an insurance company sold
forged premium finance contracts to a bank and used the money for his own purposes.
When the forgery was discovered, the bank sued the insurance company to recoup the
loss on the ground the agency had been one "to all intents and purposes," and the agent's
had been within the scope of his ostensible authority. It was held the agent lacked actual
authority. It was further held the bank had been negligent, and that such negligence
barred the action under N.D. Rev. Code § 3-0303 (1943): "A principal is bound by acts
of his agent under a merely ostensible authority to those persons only who in good faith
and without ordinary negligence have incurred a liability or parted with value upon the
faith thereof." (Emphasis supplied).
27. Weber v. United Hardware & Implement Mutuals Co., 75 N.D. 581, 592, 31
N.W.2d 456, 461 (1948).
28. N.D. Rev. Code § 3-0202 (1943).
29. N.D. Rev. Code § 3-0202 (1943) provides that an agent has authority "to make
.representation respecting any matter of fact, not including the terms of his authority,
but upon which his right to use his authority depends and the truth of which cannot be
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person to whom representations are made is under a duty to use
reasonable diligence to ascertain the truth of the agent's state-
ments.
3 0
The conclusion which suggests itself is that the authority of the
insurance agent, as the cases have developed it, is neither entirely
statutory, entirely ostensible, nor entirely of an actual character.
It appears to be based on a freehand adaptation of all three theories
tailored by the Court to fit the needs of the litigation before it,
transcending at times the precise terminology of the statutes.
III.
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
Whatever may be the ultimate conclusion reached as to the theo-
retical source of the insurance agent's authority, however, it's practi-
cal and immediate applications deserve some consideration. As
already noted, the agent possesses authority to orally renew a con-
tract about to expire, can renew it orally after it has expired, and
can make a binding oral contract of insurance on behalf of his
company even prior to the submission of a written application.31
Equally, he possesses a broad general power to waive conditions
and provisions of the policy, and his actions may in many situations
bind the company on a theory of estoppel. Probably the earliest
case on this point in this jurisdiction is Waterbury v. Dakota Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 2 in which an insurance agent, filling out an
application, falsely stated that the pipes and chimneys of a house
were in a safe condition. "Even if the statement could, from its
nature, be considered as material," declared the Court, it would
seem that the company could not avoid the policy on that account,
as it would be estopped from claiming that to be material which
their agent has, in effect, declared to be immaterial. It is too well
settled to be now questioned that the company, or its agent acting
within the scope of his authority, may waive any of the conditions
of the policy, and if at the time of issuing the policy the company
or such agent knows the falsity of a representation made by the
applicant in procuring the insurance, the company is estopped from
asserting its falsity in order to avoid liability."33
determined by the use of reasonable diligence on the part of the person to whom the
representation is made."
30. See note 29, supra. But cf. Leisen v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 20 N.D. 316,
127 N.W. 837 (1910).
31. See materials cited in note 15, supra.
32. 6 Dak. 468, 43 N.W. 697 (1889).
33. Id. at 478, 43 N.W. 700-01. Of course it should be noted that in the event an
insurance agent knowingly disregards instructions given him by his principal, he may be
held liable to the principal for the resulting loss. Queen City Fire Ins. Co. v. First National
Bank, 18 N.D. 603, 120 N.W. 545 (1909).
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This is a line of reasoning which has been subsequently followed
with considerable consistency. In Leisen v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins.
Co.,34 plaintiff applied for fire insurance. Defendant's agent negli-
gently described plaintiff's interest in the property as ownership
in fee when making out the written application. In fact plaintiff
owned a lesser interest. The policy contained a stipulation it was
void if the insured had less than sole and unconditional ownership.
It was held the insurer had knowledge of the true facts when it
issued the policy, since the knowledge of the agent was imputed to
the principal. Hence the insurer was estopped to deny liability.
Similarly, in French v. State Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co.,3 5 an
insurance agent filled out an application for hail insurance on
behalf of the plaintiff but erroneously misdescribed the applicant's
land, with the result the policy as issued covered land the applicant
did not own. It was held a contract of insurance was present and
that recovery might be had on it.
The power of waiver established by this line of cases is not
limited tb provisions of the application for insurance, but extends
to the terms and conditions of the policy as well. In McDowell v.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co.,3 a fire insurance policy contained a
provision rendering it void if the insured house remained vacant
more than ten days. The policy also provided none of its terms
might be waived by any agent of the company. The policyholder
vacated the house but informed the insurance agent of his action.
The agent said it was all right and would not make any difference.
Two months later the house, which was still unoccupied, burned
down. The company argued that by the terms of the policy the
agent lacked power to waive the non-vacancy provision. The
Court's response was that the agent had power to waive the non-
waiver stipulation as readily as anything else contained in the
policy, and had in fact done so. Much the same result was reached
in Ley v. Home Insurance Co. 3 7 Plaintiff owned a car insured by
defendant. He mortgaged the car to one Collins, but before doing
so asked defendant's agent if it was all right, and received an
affirmative answer. It was held this was an effective waiver of an
unconditional ownership clause.
Waiver is defined in the North Dakota decisions as the "voluntary
and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known exist-
34. 20 N.D. 316, 127 N.W. 837 (1910).
35. 29 N.D. 426, 151 N.W. 7 (1915).
36. 49 N.D. 176, 191 N.W. 350 (1922).
37. 64 N.D. 200, 251 N.W. 137 (1933).
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ing right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege which except for
such waiver the party would have enjoyed."38 It results from an
"unequivocal act of the insurer... indicating an intention towaive
a right. " 39 Under this definition, waiver is, of course, not limited
merely to acts of insurance solicitors. One common instance where
the attorney himself may waive the defense of non-liability of the
insurer under the terms of the policy, or even the non-existence of
a policy, occurs when he undertakes to defend, on behalf of an
insurance company, a claim brought by a third party against a
person who is purportedly a policy holder in the company. The
general rule is that where an insurance company undertakes to
defend a claim, it thereby waives the right to deny that a policy
of insurance ever existed.40 The existence of this rule has brought
about a general practice on the part of insurance companies. Norm-
ally before going into court in defense of a policy holder, they
either enter into an agreement with the policy holder to the effect
that their act in defending is not to be construed as a waiver,4' or if
such a non-waiver agreement can not be obtained, give notice to
the same effect.4 2 Either method seems equally effective.
Another common trap which deserves at least a passing mention
in this connection involves offers of settlement. Assume that an
insurance company undertakes to defend a person who is a policy-
holder, and that the adverse party makes an offer of settlement
which a reasonable person would accept. In numerous jurisdictions
-quite possible a majority-it has been held that negligent failure
to settle a claim renders the insurer liable not merely to the extent
of the policy coverage but to the full amount of the ultimate
verdict.4" However, it should be mentioned that an extremely strong
minority view declines to impose such liability on an insurer merely
for negligent failure to settle, and requires a finding of bad faith
on the part of the insurer instead.44 Whether North Dakota will
38. Sjoberg v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n of Des Moines, 78 N.D. 179, 48 N.W.2d 452
(1951), Syll. 1 2.
39. Id. at 189, 48 N.W.2d at 457.
40. See United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Grundeen, 138 F.Supp. 498,
502-03 (D.N.D. 1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1956).
41. General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Mitchell, 259 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1953);
Insurors Indem. & Ins. Co. v. Archer, 208 Okla. 57, 254 P.2d 342 (1953); Sehmierer v.
Mercer, 67 S.D. 639, 297 N.W. 682 (1941).
42. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Higgason, 175 Tenn. 357, 134 S.W.2d 169 (1940);
Connally v. Standard Cas. Co., 70 S.D. 95, 73 N.W.2d 119 (1955); Fidelity & Cas.
Co. oz New York v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 208 Ky. 429, 271 S.W. 444 (1925).
43. See general discussion in 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § § 4711-4713
(1942 ).
44. Probably the best recent case on the point is Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Comp-
any, 155 Cal. App. 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957), in which the negligence test is rejected.
But see discussion in Appleman, op cit. supra note 43, at § 4711.
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adopt the negligence test or the bad faith test in this connection
seems still an open question. There are solid arguments in favor
of either view.
IV.
DELAY IN ACTING ON APPLICATION
Still another theory on which recovery has been permitted with-
out issuance of a policy is that of negligent delay in acting on the
application for insurance. The earliest local case dealing with this
type of liability is Stearns v. Merchants Life & Casualty Co.4'
Stearns applied for an accident insurance policy on October 2,
1911, paying a $5 premium at the time of his application. He was
given a receipt in which the company agreed to return his money
if a policy was not issued in 20 days. The application contained the
customary provision that it was not binding until accepted by the
company. For unknown reasons-probably the delay of. the in-
surance agent-the application was not received at the home office
until 29 days later. By that time, Stearns had already been involved
in an accident. Ignorant of this fact, the company accepted the
application and mailed a policy. When it learned of the accident
it denied liability. The Court ruled-, however, that Steams was
covered when the accident took place. It held that in view of the
stipulation in the receipt to the effect the company had 20 days in
which to act on the application, a failure to act simply put the
contract into force anyhow.
Thereafter a number of other states reached results going con-
siderably beyond the Stearns decision and imposing liability upon
insurers for negligent delay in acting on applications, even in the
absence of such an agreed time limit. As early as 1925 the North
Dakota Court' indicated by way of a dictum its approval and
acceptance of this line of authority.4" But it was not until 1940 that
the theory of liability for negligent delay was written firmly and
unequivocally into the law of this state in a carefully considered
and exhaustively documented opinion.
The case was Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.," which in-
volved the following set of facts. On June 1, 1934, Oscar Bekken
filed a written application for a policy of insurance with the North
Dakota agent of a foreign -insurance company. On June 26, 1934,
45. 38 N.D. 524, 165 N.W. 568 (1917). For a sharp criticism of the action for negli-
gent delay, see Prosser, Delay in Acting on an ,Application for Insurance, 3 U.Chi.L.Rev.
39 (1935). See also Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications, 75
U.Pa.L.Rev. 207 (1927).
46. In re Coughlin's Estate, 53 N.D. 188, 194, 205 N.W. 14, 16 (1925).
47. 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940).
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a total of 25- days later, the company had neither accepted nor
rejected the policy. Bekken was killed in an accident on that date.
His widow filed suit against the company for the face value of the
policy he had applied for. The insurer contended that since the
applicati'n had never been accepted no contract of insurance
existed and -it was accordingly not liable.
The Supreme Court made the following statement in disposing
of the case:
"There is a conflict in the authorities as to whether legal obliga-
tions arise only after a contract of insurance has been made, or
whether in certain circumstances a legal duty arises, from the
relationship created during the negotiations between an applicant
for insurance and the insurance company, to act promptly upon
the application, and to inform the applicant whether the offer is
accepted or rejected. Generally speaking, there are two main
lines of decisions dealing with these questions. According to one
view, the legal relations between an applicant and the insurance
company 'are fundamentally the same as those between parties
negotiating any other contract, and are purely contractual;' that
*mere delay, mere inaction by an insurance company in passing
on an application does not constitute an acceptance or establish
the relationship of insurer and insured,' and that such delay or
inaction does not constitute any breach of duty by the insurance
company. . . .According to this view, no duty arises unless, and
until, a contract has been created; if there is no contract, there is
no duty, and consequently there is no liability on the part of the
insurer because of any delay or inaction on its part in passing
upon the application, or in issuing or delivering 'the policy . . .
"The other. line of decisions holds that an insurance company
that has solicited and received a completed application for
insurance is under a legal duty to take prompt action on the
application, and give prompt notice to the applicant of its action;
and that consequently such insurance company is liable in tort
for negligent delay in acting upon the application and notifying
the 'applicant in case the application is rejected:'. .. In our opinion
this latter line of decisions announces the correct principle."48
The Court then ruled that the evidence was sufficient to make
it possible for a jury to find the insurer had been guilty of negligent
delay, and held in favor of the widow. In 1952, it applied the
same principle to allow recovery where a doctor's error in report-
48. Id. at 136-38, 293 N.W. at 209-10.
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ing the results of an insurance examination also caused an unreason-
able .delay during which the applicant died.4 9
While the idea that a party may be held to have committed a
tort by failing to enter into a contract is in some respects a strik-
ing one, the cases cited indicate that it is at present firmly estab-
lished as a part of the jurisprudence of North Dakota. Several
points are apparent with regard to it. It is obvious, for example,
that the action for negligent delay differs sharply in its funda-_
mental characteristics from actions based on oral agreements by
insurance agents or actions based on a theory of waiver or estoppel,
The latter cases affirm the existence of a contract under which a
right of recovery exists, while the gist of the action for negligent
delay is found in the proposition that the tort of the insurer has
prevented a contract from being formed, thereby proximately
causing the applicant to sustain a loss because except for the in-
surer's negligent conduct he would have been covered by insurance.
The agency and estoppel cases thus assert the contract, while the
action for negligent delay is premised on its non-existence.
The tort arises from a breach of the duty of promptness which
the Court has imposed on insurers by reason of the nature and
characteristics of the insurance business. One may ask, therefore,
to whom the duty of promptness runs. By whom can it be enforced?
Quite clearly, the applicant himself can .enforce it, since the
insurer has solicited his application and thereby assumed the
"special relationship" toward him from which the Court has held
the duty of promptness arises. Equally, the estate of the applicant
obviously is entitled to maintain the action, since any claim against
the insurer possessed by the applicant would survive his death.50
And it has been held that the beneficiary designated by the
applicant in his application may maintain such an action, both on
the theory he is a third-party beneficiary of a contract made for
his benefit and on the ground he is the real party, in interest. 1
Beyond this circle, however, the right to maintain the action be-
comes considerably more dubious. Toward third parties Who have
submitted no application and have no part in the insurance trans-
action the insurer has assumed no duty and made no representa-
tions. In the case of liability insurance, in fact, the insurer's position
toward anyone but the policy applicant is manifestly adverse from
its inception, since the insurer is bound, to defend the insured
49. Mann v. Policyholders Nat. Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N4.W.2d 853 (1952).
50. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-01261 (Supp. 1957); Note, 27 N.Dak.L.Rev. 208 (1951),,
51. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,.supra.
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person in any action asserting his liability.5 2 Hence it seems
apparent that as to third parties the action for negligent delay must
be deemed derivative at best; they are not entitled to recover
against the insurer for negligent delay unless the applicant himself
would be so entitled, and even then it is apparent some sort of
formal transfer or assignment of the claim must be made from the
applicant to the third party.5 3 Otherwise the insurer might be ex-
posed to a double liability.
Under the present holdings, the duty of the insurer is one of
reasonable promptness under the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. North Dakota has enacted no statute defining the
time period within which the insurer must act except in the case
of hail insurance, which becomes automatically effective 24 hours
after application for it is made. Cases in other jurisdictions indicate
that an insurer is reasonably safe if it acts within a two-week period
or slightly longer,5 4 but this is a flexible matter about which few
generalizations may be made with safety. In the Bekken case, as
already noted, 25 days was deemed sufficient to allow the inference
of negligence. Where the time is used by the insurer in a good
faith effort to investigate the suitability of the risk, there are cases
holding no unreasonable delay may be inferred?5
Since the negligent delay cases involve a tort arising from breach
of a duty of reasonable promptness, it seems apparent that the
insurer, like any other defendant charged with negligence, possesses
the right to plead contributory negligence and assumption of risk
on the part of the plaintiff as defenses. Thus, assuming a case in
which delay has occurred in passing on an application for life
insurance, it seems likely the insurer would be excused in the event
the applicant's own negligence was the proximate cause of his
death. The court in the Bekken case made the point that Bekken
himself was not at fault with regard to his fatal accident. 6 Where
the applicant is not an insurable risk, it is obvious no amount of
delay on the part of the insurer could conceivably be the proximate
52. See N.D. Rev. Code § 22-0207 (4) (5) (1943).
53. Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co., 155 Cal.App. 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
54. Burks v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 192 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1951); Behnke
v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 41 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1930); Winn v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 1249, 250 N.W. 459 (1933); Page v. National Automobile Ins.
Co.. 109 Neb. 127, 190 N.W. 213 (1922).
55. McLendon v. Woodmen of World, 106 Tenn. 695, 64 S.W. 36 (1901); Shawnee
Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. McClure, 39 Okla. 535, 135 Pac. 1150 (1913); Zielinski v. General
American Life Ins. Co., 96 S.W.2d 1059 (Mo.App. 1936).
56. Bekken v, Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 124, 293 N.W. 200, 203
(1940).
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In this brief examination of a few local cases the writer has not
attempted to draw any profound conclusions, but merely to present
a summary of the existing state of the North Dakota law. If
suggestions as to change in this field were in order, however, one
might suggest the desirability of establishing a definite time limit
for acceptance or rejection of an application by an insurance
company, on the ground that the present rules leave it a matter of
doubt and conjecture whether in a given case the insurer has
breached the duty of promptness. They thus benefit neither insurer
nor applicant. Equally, a more precise definition of the powers of
insurance agents might readily lend itself to legislative considera-
tion.
57. Behnke v. Standard Aco. Ins. Co., 41 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1930); Smither v.
United Ben. Life Ins. Co., 164 Kan. 447, 190 P .2d 183 (1948); Thomas v. Life Ins.
Co. of Georgia, 219 La. 1099, 55 So.2d 705 (1951).
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